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Introduction:
Critique and the Deconstruction of
Anthropological Authority
Peter Pels and Lorraine Nencel
This book began to take shape in December 1988. The setting was
the Department of Cultural Anthropology at the University of
Amsterdam. A conference was held in memory of the anthropol-
ogist Bob Scholte, whose sudden death in the preceding year shook
his students and colleagues profoundly. The Conference was
intended to follow lines of critical and reflexive inquiry initiated
by, among others, Scholte himself. It appeared to be a particularly
auspicious moment for such an event, as critical, feminist and
symbolic perspectives in anthropology seemed to converge.
Political critique, reflexive analysis and the experience of multiple
voices had combined to produce doubts about the authority of the
anthropological expert, whose line of descent includes sexist, racist
and imperialist ancestors. As anthropological authority was ques-
tioned and the anthropologist's voice toned down, there seemed to
be a promise for a conversation with other voices.
Yet, despite the potential present at the Conference to engage in
frui tful conversation, more often than not it resembled a show- j
down, a confrontation between (academic) identities. The configur- !
ation of opponents changed continuously and pitted neo-Marxists, j
feminists and postmodernists against their respective others. No one ;
could deny the academic vigour displayed at the event. But at the
same time, the confrontations reinforced the impression of a stale-
mate in anthropology.'
As we write this Introduction, we have become increasingly aware
that the Conference portrayed to a certain extent the current state
of the art of anthropology and reverberated the debates which are
occurring in the other human sciences. The feeling of crisis could
easily be attributed to the ingression of postmodernist thought and
its tendency to undermine all efforts at legitimation of the scientific
project. But this explanation ignores the fact that postmodernism in
anthropology is a product of a history of critical and reflexive
initiatives.
Anthropology's root, its preoccupation and confrontation with
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the 'other' of the white male academic, has sprouted branches
which have contributed to postmodern initiatives. Instead of taking
the easy way out by accepting postmodernism as the most influen-
tial current in contemporary anthropology,2 we opt for a different
interpretation. We think the feeling of crisis is generated by the
fact that anthropology, like other social sciences, has developed a
thorough critique of its own academic authority since the 1960s.
Anthropology has reached a stage at which even the critics of
academic authority criticize each other's authority.
The papers collected in this volume address the present situation
of professional uncertainty. They deal with problems related to the
legitimation of anthropological projects and to the identity of the
anthropologist in the field and at the academy. All the papers
grapple with the critique of grand theories, of academic rhetoric and
of fieldwork practice. The diagnoses and therapies they propose or
deny are different and at times in conflict. The reader might get the
impression that the present stage in the development of anthro-
pology is one of a paradoxical convergence: a situation of fragmen-
tation in which everybody is denied the possibility of ready-made
political, theoretical or methodological solutions. For the post-
modernist, all seems to be well.
However, is it possible simply to accept the lack of a common
identity or a common project in anthropology? We, the editors of
this book, are still baffled by the experience of a conference room
full of critical and reflexive anthropologists whose critique of each
other seemed to preclude reflexivity in debate and conversation.
Why is feminist anthropology still largely the province of women?
Why are many politically engaged anthropologists worried by post-
modern initiatives? Why have the promises of earlier decades
crumbled under the weight of criticism and counter-criticism? We
think that it would be wrong to erase from this volume the context
of disagreement in which these chapters were first presented. We
propose, in this Introduction, to provide that context by an inter-
pretation of the role of critical perspectives in anthropology and
their relationship to the profession. This will give the non-
anthropological reader a more comprehensive - though simplified -
view of the field under discussion. Moreover, it will give us the
opportunity to formulate our misgivings about present so-called
'postmodern' attempts to reformulate the professional task of the
anthropologist. These attempts, it seems to us, call for a restatement
of the reflexive critique of anthropology which Bob Scholte intro-
duced (1974).
Before we do this, a word on the relevance of these papers for non-
anthropological readers. The history of anthropology has its own
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rhythm; it is more closely linked to colonialism and neo-colonialism
than any other social science. The end of political colonialism in the
1960s has hurt anthropology's authority more than that of other
disciplines. However, now that anthropology questions its capacity
to define authoritatively the non-Western other, it returns to the
metropolis with fresh approaches to the Western self. Nowadays,
ethnography and anthropological theory are deployed to investigate
and criticize the central metaphors of Western identity (see, for
instance, Sahlins, 1976; Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Thus, because
of its sociohistorical position on the boundaries of Western culture,
anthropology promises a more radical reflexivity, which can be of
use to all social scientists.
Critique in occidental anthropology
Professional authority and cultural critique
One of the most curious documents in the history of anthropology
is surely Malinowski's reaction to an attack by the Chief Secretary
of the Government of Tanganyika Territory, P.E. Mitchell
(Malinowski, 1930). From the opening sentences, it is hard to
imagine that we are dealing with the leader of British functional
anthropology who is engaged in a campaign to sell his discipline to
the colonial establishment. On the contrary, Malinowski eloquently
laments 'the curse of science'. 'Science is the worst nuisance and the
greatest calamity of our days.' Modern man is condemned to
'passive receptivity', to a 'standardized level of taste . . . at the cost
of originality and spontaneous life':
One of the refuges from this mechanical prison of culture is the study
of primitive forms of human life as they still exist in remote parts of our
globe. Anthropology, to me at least, was a romantic escape from our
overstandardized culture . . . And now, after twenty years of anthro-
pological work, I find myself, to my disgust, attempting to make the
science of man into as bad and dehumanizing an agency to man as
physics, chemistry, and biology have been for the last century or so
denaturalizing to nature. In short, I am attempting to make anthro-
pology into a real science. (Malinowski, 1930: 406)
Subsequently, the tortured writer settles for the dictatorship of
instrumental rationality with resignation, only comforted by 'the
feeling of power given by the sense of control of human reality
through the establishment of general laws'. This power should be
harnessed in order to 'assist colonial control' if only stubborn
administrators like Mitchell could be convinced of the value of
anthropology.
The essay summarizes Malinowski's trajectory since his fieldwork
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in the Trobriand Islands and the writing of Argonauts of the
Western Pacific (1922). He has left much of his earlier critique of
missionaries and colonial administrators behind (see Powdermaker,
1966: 43). Through his intensive contacts with missionaries such as
J.H. Oldham and former administrators like Lord Lugard in the
International African Institute, Malinowski hoped to attract Rocke-
feller money to support functionalist anthropologists at the expense
of their 'antiquarian' colleagues such as Elliot Smith - and he
succeeded (see Stocking, 1985).3
Therefore, Malinowski had to claim a special role for the profes-
sional anthropologist. He argued that functional anthropology was
a necessity for the 'practical man' in the colonies, and that the
anthropological fieldworker was the only one capable of filling that
need (Malinowski, 1929). As Mitchell's reaction (1930) shows, not
all practical men agreed with this claim to professional authority
(see Junod, 1935 for a missionary's qualms on the subject). But,
after 1945, functionalist anthropology was firmly established, both
in the colonies and in the academy.
Malinowski's essay shows that a critical attitude towards the
achievements of Western civilization contradicts the claim to serve
its civilizing mission. However, it also shows that the one could not
exist without the other. Both are based on the Western anthropol-
ogist's desire to be the broker of ways of life and thought different
from those at home. The postulate of a cultural 'other' was a
necessary element of gaining professional authority and a position
from which to speak to the anthropologist's clients in the colonies
and at home. The middleman was Janus-faced, however: to speak
for others often implied defending them and, consequently, to
attack the ethnocentrism of the values of one's own civilization.4
Thus, the critical impact of classical anthropology was mainly
related to the anthropologist as the broker of the other's culture.
The impact of anthropology was to relativize, either in the subor-
dinate sense of adjusting colonial policy to a better knowledge of
the culture of the colonized, or in the absolute sense (defended by
the American culturalists, see Leclerc, 1973: 100) of proclaiming an
ineradicable difference, essentialized in the concept of culture.
The consciousness of different cultures gave, and still gives,
anthropology much of its distinctiveness. It is the basis on which
Michel Foucault (1973: 373ff) and Leszek Kolakowski (cited in
Lemaire, this volume) claim a peculiar and unique mission for
anthropology: the ability to be a 'principle of perpetual dissatisfac-
tion', a permanent scepticism about the possibility of the Western
ratio. This classical critique of Western values was most forcefully
reasserted in the early 1960s by culturalism and structuralism, two
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new or not-so-new appearances of the brokerage of other points of
view. For Clifford Geertz, anthropological authority was founded
on the capacity to read and reproduce cultural differences by
describing indigenous symbolic systems (Geertz, 1973). Levi-
Strauss argued that the sterility of Western philosophical opposi-
tions could be countered and raised to a new level of universal
awareness by taking the other's way of reasoning seriously (Levi-
Strauss, 1962). Geertz based his theory on a Weberian inter-
pretative approach, and Levi-Strauss was influenced by linguistic
theory from which he derived a radical break with empiricism.
These two perspectives made an important contribution to the
radical reflexivities that emerged in the late 1960s.
Epistemological rupture and the intrusion of politics
The political upheavals that rocked the anthropological boat in the
late 1960s were preceded by another important development in the
early years of that decade outside anthropology: the rupture in
scientific consciousness that was produced by Thomas Kuhn's book
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). Suddenly, scientific
procedure seemed to lose its foundations that had rested on systems
of logical reasoning and the application of correct methodologies of
empirical research. Science was no longer a unilinear process of
accumulating knowledge. It underwent paradigmatic shifts carried
through by groups of scientists. The paradigms at one period were
not built progressively from the preceding paradigms; they were
simply incommensurable with each other. Kuhn claimed 'a role for
history' (1962: 1-9), exposing science to the external influences that
academic authority is meant to keep at bay.
As Scholte (1983) points out, Kuhn's theses were taken up by
many young anthropologists and used to attack established anthro-
pology and its entrenched symbolic systems, evolutionisms and the
like. If society entered into the constitution of a scientific
paradigm, then politics must be part of this influence. Combined
with the inspiration of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School,
the 'Kuhnian break' provided the conditions under which the
supposed neutrality of theory and method could be unmasked as
a Western ideology.
Critique of anthropology inspired by Kuhn never developed into
a distinct movement: before long, 'paradigm' became a household
word which often served to define one's theoretical identity against
that of other fellow academics. While Kuhn's theory was reinter-
preted to reinforce academic authority, Feyerabend's plea for
scientific anarchy (1975) was not an alternative either. It relin-
quished criteria of judgement, the boundaries between the scientific
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and non-scientific, and therefore also alternatives for classical
scientism in anthropology. Critique derived from the history of
science only proved powerful in combination with other intrusions
in anthropological self-consciousness. A most persistent, though
for a long time marginal, current was the epistemological critique
of anthropology which combined critical theory - the work of
Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas and others - with the Kuhnian
break. Fed by phenomenology and the critique of structural
linguistics, it provided an alternative to positivism by concentrating
on ethnography as communication (see, for instance, Fabian,
1971b). The epistemological critique, however, was only a part of
what was later to be called 'critical anthropology' (see Scholte,
1978a). As Fabian has written, 'critical anthropology' is hard to
define, as it corresponds to no distinct social entity, subdisciplinary
boundary, content or method.5 Its unity is mainly historical, a
movement characterized by certain common themes which emerged
in the late 1960s.
Professional complacency was no longer possible in the face of
the destruction wrought by Kuhn, Feyerabend and their followers.
Academic authority appeared in a new light, as an ideology. The
first steps towards an anthropology of anthropology (Scholte,
1966) and a history of anthropology (Stocking, 1982, first
published 1968) were soon followed by a critique of the uses of
anthropology in colonialism (Asad, 1973) and an attempt to 'rein-
vent' the discipline (Hymes, 1974). Even if the critics did not have
links to the politicized counter-culture that threw up barricades in
Berkeley, Paris and elsewhere (and at least some of them did),
establishment anthropologists identified them with it. They saw in
the new developments the influence of 'flickering lights and the use
of drugs' (Max Gluckman, cited in Scholte, 1978a: 5) or of
'mystics, religious fanatics and California cultists' (Marvin Harris,
cited in Ortner, 1984: 126).
Unlike certain American Indian and African scholars (Deloria,
1969: 83ff, p'Bitek, 1970: 6), radical anthropologists did not call
for a complete abandonment of anthropology. However, the first
question in Hymes's introduction to Reinventing Anthropology
was whether anthropology, if it did not exist, would have to be
invented (1974: 3). The answer was no. Anthropology was, to a
large extent, a survival from a colonial past, and the 'niche' in
which it found its professional home had disappeared (1974: 4).
The 'reinvention' of anthropology was in fact an attack on all the
trappings of classical anthropology and its professional legitima-
tion. 'The entire profession is on trial' (Fabian, 1971b: 19). Train-
ing provided by anthropology departments was seen as inhibiting
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(Scholte, 1983: 241). There were attempts to restructure the
depoliticized nature of anthropological fieldwork (the idea of
'action-research'; see Huizer and Schrijvers (both in this volume)
for an overview of the literature). Many critical anthropologists
found a rival theoretical legitimation in Marx. The relegation of
culture to the domain of ideology (Ortner, 1984: 140) made room
for a rival conception of difference which stressed the power
differences created by global capitalism.
The attack on the profession plunged anthropology into crisis.
Once the complex of classical anthropological authority - univer-
sity education, value-free theory, the brokerage of cultural
difference, the legitimation of fieldwork as a politically innocent
method - became suspect, the former plurality of theories within
a professional framework developed into an incommensurability of
anthropological identities. From the position of radical critique,
any anthropologist who did not align him- or herself with the
project of global liberation that it promised was under suspicion.
The most radical attacks on the profession, however, did not
enjoy a long life in the academic context. Attempts at reform (such
as the action-research perspective) did not take a firm hold, and
the critique of anthropology's colonial and neo-colonial uses (Wolf
and Jorgensen, 1970; Asad, 1973) failed to continue its rewriting
of anthropology's history. The attention of the practitioners of
'critical anthropology* turned to the perfecting of its neo-Marxist
theoretical armour and its ethnographic potential, to the correction
of male or class bias, and to the formulation of alternative
epistemologies. In 1978, Scholte complained that the critical
perspective was in danger of being domesticated by the establish-
ment and was in need of reflexive critique in order to avoid being
encapsulated by it (Scholte, 1978a).
The radical critique of anthropology, which illuminated its role
in colonialist and neo-colonialist practices, has recently been called
'a document of the moment' which was 'too immoderate and
ungrounded in practice to have much effect' (Marcus and Fischer,
1986: 34-5); its negative portrayal of the anthropologist was an
unrealistic 'caricature' (Clifford, 1986: 9); its critique 'merely scrat-
ched the surface' (Ortner, 1984: 138). Thus, the contemporary
interpretation of this instance in anthropology has transformed it
into a historical relic. It is possible that this attempt to dismiss
radical critique is part of the re-entrenchment of academic
authority. We will elaborate on this below.
Of the 'critical anthropologies' that emerged in the wake of the
radical critique of the late 1960s, Marxism and feminism deserve
our special attention. The critique of class and male bias in
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anthropology brought distinct political intrusions to the fore which
directly affected the conception of the anthropological object.
Classical anthropology hid its political projects: the responsibility
for the creation and legitimation of professional anthropology and
for the support of colonialism was covered with the cloak of the
neutral and value-free study of cultural difference. In contrast,
both Marxism and feminism brought a political project - the
emancipation of the oppressed - to front stage by conceptualizing
the object as the study of the oppressed and the ways in which they
are oppressed.
Culture, for Marxists, is first of all ideology, and serves projects
of domination in society (Ortner, 1984: 140). Culture obscures the
material relations of production and the processes of class-
formation, and therefore has to be criticized. Thus, Marxism
provided an alternative conception to the classical anthropological
object - other cultures - by replacing it with differences in class
or mode of production. This alternative conception of the anthro-
pological object was a necessary component of the critique of
professionalism. However, the Marxist critique of the primacy of
cultural difference reduced the relativizirig potential of anthro-
pology. Marxism faced the paradox of pleading for a 'view from
below' (see Huizer and Mannheim, 1979), while at the same time
denying the value of the cultures in which this view could be
expressed.
The early feminist critics of anthropology were in a still more
complex position. They shared objectives with both leftist politics
and classical anthropology, but were dissatisfied with both. On the
one hand, the 'anthropology of women' sought to correct male
bias in the discipline by challenging the representation of women
by existing perspectives in anthropology. The critique of male bias
was in many ways a form of the critique of ethnocentrism (see
Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1974: 2). As such, it 'shared the majority
of anthropology's aims' (Moore, 1988: 187). Moore may be right
in claiming that in this respect the anthropology of women was
'more remedial than radical' (1988: 6), although one should not
underestimate the substantive theoretical innovations of the
formal/informal power, domestic/public and nature/culture
debates.
On the other hand, the inspiration and political urgency
provided by the feminist movement could also be expressed in the
more radical form of Marxist feminism (see Nash and Safa, 1976;
Critique of Anthropology, 1977). This current seems to have had
more influence on European feminist anthropology and was
theoretically most forcefully expressed by relating gender ideology
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to the re-evaluation of women's reproductive labour and their posi-
tion in the labour market.6 But the attitude towards Marxism was
similar to that taken towards classical 'cultural' anthropology: it is
essential to correct for male bias (see, for instance, Molyneux, in
Critique of Anthropology, 1977).
Feminist anthropology was inspired by the critique of
inequalities between men and women in Western society and this
is probably the major reason why it has been, and still is, 'ghet-
toized' in the academic sphere (Moore, 1988: 6). However, early
feminist critique began to speak of women for women (see Rosaldo
and Lamphere, 1974: 1), and it used existing forms of critique (of
ethnocentrism and of capitalism) in order to develop its approach
to the question of the universal subordination of women. This
restriction of the feminist voice may have limited its potential to
criticize its own marginalization and recognize its own forms of
ethnocentrism obscured by the concept of universal subordina-
tion.7 It did not attack the profession as a whole (except as Marx-
ist feminism), but only its representation of women. When the
emphasis shifted from 'women' to male-female relations and
gender systems, feminism invaded traditional topoi of
anthropology such as kinship theory (see Rubin, 1975; Ortner and
Whitehead, 1981). It made undisputably clear that the study of
gender was a concern of anthropology as a whole. But at the same
time, feminists questioned the universality of women's subordina-
tion (see Poewe, 1981). This critique of the essentialist conception
of the object of feminist anthropology (see Rosaldo, 1980a) is, in
the last analysis, a critique of the constitution of the anthropo-
logical object as such. We will turn to that in the next section.
Critique of universalism and the dcconstruction of
ethnographic authority
Sherry Ortner's essay on anthropological theory (1984) was the
first attempt to delineate some order in anthropology since the late
1960s (for example, Harris, 1968). Ortner predicted that the 1980s
would see the reign of the concept of practice (1984: 144ff). She
suggested that the sense of crisis felt by many of anthropology's
practitioners in the late 1970s in fact concealed a convergence of
perspectives, a cross-fertilization which opened up the comfortable
prospect of normal science under a stable paradigm.
In a sense, we share with Ortner a feeling of convergence and a
growing consciousness of common problems in anthropology.
However, we tend to be a bit more cynical. The crisis in anthro-
pology is, after all, not generated by the lack of a theoretical
common denominator, but by the breakdown of classical anthro-
pological authority. If there was a 'convergence' in anthropology
in the 1980s, it came from the fact that the authority of anthro-
pologists had been further deconstructed, resulting in a shared
recognition of the problematic status of their claim to speak for
others.
We would like to highlight two features of this development. The
first is the critique of universalism in feminist and Marxist
anthropology, and the second the demise of ethnographic
authority.
The loss of a universal object
Both Marxism and feminism in anthropology brought a political
project into the open. Marxism provided the theoretical armour
which served to describe the global subjection of the peoples of the
world to capitalist domination, while the anthropology of women
started from the assumption of woman's universal subordination.
Thus, they shared a similar epistemological approach: their stories
gained their validity from the fact that they could claim to speak
from a subordinate position: the world's truths were deemed easier
to apprehend from the bottom up than from the top down. This
view from below was based on a universal object (the subordina-
tion of the world under capitalism, the universal subordination of
women, or of women under capitalism) which supported their
political projects (the liberation of their respective oppressed).
The crisis of legitimation that took shape during the 1970s and
1980s within 'critical anthropology' was in many ways produced by
a critique of the universality of the object. An epistemology based
on the privileged viewpoint of the oppressed assumed this view-
point and therefore objectified it before even the oppressed
themselves had been heard. In a sense, Marxists and feminists
encountered a similar predicament in relation to non-Western
others as the critique of classical anthropology had brought
forward. Value-free social science, as proclaimed in classical
anthropology, kept silent about its political alliances with
colonialism, and also about its own politics of knowledge: the
claim to the professional status on the basis of a privileged access
to 'other cultures'. In this way, it hid its political project behind a
neutral object (see Pels, 1983). Marxism and feminism, in contrast,
did not keep silent about their political alliances, but initially failed
to problematize their politics of knowledge. While they did not
hide their non-academic engagement behind a neutral object, the
claim to speak from the viewpoint of the oppressed did conceal a
politics of knowledge, a claim to authority which gave Western
academics the power to define problems and solutions (see Scholte,
1983: 263; Moore, 1988).
It seems that of the two critiques, the feminist one was the first
to address this problem. The fact that feminist anthropologists
partly relied on the critique of ethnocentrism and partly on the
critique of capitalism may have contributed to the raising of ques-
tions about the universality of the subordination of women. The
shift from 'defining women' (Ardener, 1978) to the study of
gender, that is, male-female relations (Ortner and Whitehead,
1981) was based on relativizing the former Western assumption
that male dominance was universal. This relativizing was clearly
inspired by symbolic anthropology, the heir of culturalism. In a
pivotal article, Michelle Rosaldo argued that the most serious
problem of feminist theory was the tendency to cast problems in
universal terms on the basis of dichtomous assumptions of male
and female nature (1980a: 414-15). Karla Poewe used the inspira-
tion of Marxism to try to demonstrate that, in fact, universal male
dominance is a fiction (1981: 25-51).
Thus, gender theory developed a critique of the essentialized
conception of the universal object of feminist theory. The object
could no longer be conceived as the complex of male dominance
and female subordination only. From both culturalist and Marxist
perspectives, feminist anthropology developed a perspective in
which no single conception of difference (gender, culture, class)
could predominate. When, therefore, black women criticized
Western feminist 'imperialism' (see Moors, in this volume, p. 122,
n. 6), it became clear that the power of Western feminists to define
the object in universal terms was suspect. The common identity of
women as subordinate to male dominance could not be upheld in
the face of a proliferation of cultural, gender, class and race
differences. The universal 'sameness' of women was lost (Moore,
1988: 10).
This deconstruction of the object did not necessarily imply the
loss of a common political project (the emancipation of women),
but it was clear that the legitimation of the project by its connec-
tion with a universal object could no longer be taken for granted.
Presently, commonalities among women have to be demonstrated,
not assumed (Rosaldo, 1980a: 417; Moore, 1988: 198). Feminist
anthropology, once inspired by feminist politics, now attempts to
reform it by stressing the necessity of solidarity through difference
(Richters, in this volume).
For critical anthropology inspired by Marxism, the loss of a
universal object seems harder to countenance. Marxism fuses
object and project by looking at culture as ideology, as a
Fi.
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superstructure which serves to reproduce relations of production
and class inequalities (Ortner, 1984: 140). Thus, the project
becomes the critique of the classical anthropological object, replac-
ing it by an alternative object, class difference. Many are
justifiably loath to give up this powerful heuristic apparatus, which
provides the 'reinvention' of anthropology with the most complete
set of alternatives to classical authority: theory, object,
epistemology and politics all in one. But Marxism also carries
ethnocentricities and biases which contribute to a crisis in its own
legitimation.
This becomes especially clear when the reduction of culture to
ideology is questioned. By identifying culture with ideology, Marx-
ist anthropology tends to reduce culture to dominance. In this way
it denies others their means of cultural expression, including
expressions of resistance. Thus, the critique of global structures of
domination reproduces these structures in text, giving the impres-
sion of a monolithic apparatus of power impossible to resist
(Fabian, this volume).8 All voices - except the anthropologist's -
are drowned by the drone of capitalism and its subordinate modes
of production. Or is it the drone of the analysis of capitalism? In
this context, the question of whether Marxist anthropologists are
themselves aiming at unquestioned authority becomes focal (see
Scholte, 1983: 242, 263).
If the critique of the conception of culture as ideology does not
serve to shrink the object of Marxist anthropology to less than
universal size, there still remains the problem of the proliferation
of differences brought to the fore by feminist anthropology. Class
differences cannot encompass ethnic, race and gender differences.
As it becomes more difficult to legitimate the critical project by
means of a universal object - the structures of dominance created
by global capitalism - Marxist anthropology faces the fate from
which feminist anthropology freed itself: being reduced to a
remedial exercise, merely correcting class bias in anthropology. In
a sense, Marxist social scientists are already engaged in such a
remedial exercise by responding to the critiques of academic
authority which have been labelled 'postmodern' (see, for instance,
Jameson, 1984b). The response is formidable, but it remains a
response. In the questioning of hegemonic discourse in anthro-
pology, the initiative has now been taken by the literary critics of
academic rhetoric.
The literary turn: questioning ethnographic authority
If 'practice' was the catchword of anthropological theory in the
past decade, 'text' was the central metaphor of its epistemological
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reflections. Anthropology took a literary turn in the 1980s, follow-
ing the discovery that apart from being researchers and theorists,
anthropologists are ethnographers, that is: writers.
One of the first and most radical critiques of ethnographic
authority came from outside the discipline, from literary studies.
Edward Said's Orientalism (1978) was an attack on that most
elementary aspect of professional authority of anthropologists: the
postulate of cultural difference and the subsequent necessity to
translate it into 'our' terms. Orientalism, according to Said, was a
means of the West to represent the other to itself. The other was
subjected to a complicated apparatus of creating difference which
was part of occidental strategies to reproduce its global power.
Said takes a clearly anti-anthropological stance (see also Said,
1989), suggesting that the necessity of translation of cultural
difference serves the anthropologist's or orientalist's professional
interests.
Said's critique of orientalist ethnography appealed to a certain
strand of anthropological critique which, though also politically
engaged, did not completely identify with the Marxist position.
This strand combined epistemological critique with issues derived
from the critique of structural linguistics (the 'ethnography of
speaking', see Hymes, 1970), focusing on the epistemology of field-
work practice to produce an account of ethnography as communi-
cation (Fabian, 1971b, 1979c). Analysts showed that while the
fieldwork process depended on communication, this shared
experience of anthropologist and informant was deleted from the
ethnography that was its result (Dwyer, 1977, 1979; Fabian, 1979c,
1983; Webster, 1982). Consequently, the ethnographic text
appeared in a new light: it lost its continuity with the fieldwork
situation. Ethnography was not simply 'writing up' research: it
turned out to be a genre which creates its own authority by
rhetorical means (Clifford, 1983).
When writing lost the innocence of a mere recording device, it
was clear that writing practice was a form of interpretation. Inter-
pretive philosophy (Ricoeur, Gadamer) flowered under the aegis of
symbolic anthropology which remained sceptical towards Marxist
analysis and the ethnocentric implications of its 'practical reason"
(Sahlins, 1976). Hermeneutics and the critique of ethnographic
writing linked up to produce a sustained critique of the ethno-
graphic genre which emphasized the experimentation with texts to
devise new and more justifiable forms of 'writing culture' (Marcus,
1980; Marcus and Cushman, 1982; Clifford and Marcus, 1986;
Marcus and Fischer, 1986).
The apparent compatibility of the critique of ethnographic
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writing and hermeneutics conceals a difference in their critical
approaches. The contributions of Said and the ethnography of
fieldwork communication were inspired by an approach that was
critical of the postulate of cultural difference (see Moors, in this
volume). Both implied that the object of anthropology was created
by a projection of difference, by constituting the other as other,
and that this constitution of the object was part of a hegemonic
discourse characteristic of the West. Instead, the ethnography of
fieldwork communication concentrated on what anthropologists
and informants shared. Whether in terms of 'dialogue' (Dwyer,
1977) or 'coevalness' (Fabian, 1983), the emphasis was on the way
anthropologists and informants co-produced ethnographic knowl-
edge. In that way, the authority of the anthropological fieldworker
was qualified and the assumption of the primacy of cultural
difference questioned. Through the alliance between hermeneutics
and symbolic anthropology, however, the critique of ethnography
retained a link to the classical locus of anthropological authority:
the interpretation of cultural difference. We will return to this issue
below.
The movement of textual criticism was quickly labelled 'post-
modern'. But if the postmodern condition is, as Lyotard (1984:
xxiii) argues, a crisis of legitimation based on incredulity towards
metanarratives, several of the critics of ethnographic authority are
not so much 'post'-modernists as modernists of the literary turn.
Their 'crisis of representation' is merely an experimental moment
in which we can look for other, and possibly more adequate,
means of representation (Marcus and Fischer, 1986). Their
experiments do not produce the bewilderment created by a truly
'postmodern' crisis of legitimation in which the possibility of
representation per se is questioned (see Clifford, 1986: 21; Tyler,
1987c).
What are the implications of the crisis of representation or
legitimation for critique in and of anthropology? Since we stand in
the middle of the postmodern movement, it is difficult to point to
a single direction. Different histories of critique emerge from it,
which display certain similarities but are sometimes radically
opposed in their explicit aims and manifestos. The present volume
brings some of them together (compare for instance the chapters of
Richters and Tyler in this volume). It is not necessary to repeat
these arguments in this Introduction. But we would like to point
out a feature of the crossroads on which we seem to be standing
now.
Jean-Paul Dumont has written that two steps can be distin-
guished in the literary turn in anthropology. The first is the critique
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of the hitherto unquestioned links between hegemonic discourse
and anthropological rhetoric, a project which seems commen-
surable with critical perspectives in and of anthropology (Dumont,
1988: 6). Political projects such as the Marxist and feminist may
lose their legitimation by a universal object, but that does not
necessarily mean that they lose the capacity of critique as such.
One has to balance the different objects of a critique: ethnocen-
trism, racism, phallocentrism, capitalism, scientism. While the
critique of scientific discourse may seem unsettling, it also promises
a liberation from hitherto constraining narratives, opening up the
possibility of participation in political projects that do not need the
'sameness' of a unitary object as legitimation.
The second step, however, is more distressing for the possibility
of a critique: the question whether representation is at all legitimate
(Dumont, 1988: 6). This question is most forcefully put by Stephen
Tyler (in this volume). When he argues that critique is necessarily
implicated in what is criticized and is therefore part of the
totalitarian Gestell, this may shock the hitherto heterogeneous
practitioners of 'critical anthropology' into an awareness of what
they have in common.9 With Tyler, the crisis of representation
becomes the end-game of anthropology, even of the human
sciences in general, as he goes beyond Lyotard's pragmatic affir-
mation of narrative (see Jameson, 1984b for a lucid interpretation
of Lyotard's position). If no story can be legitimated, then, indeed,
'how about . . .'?'°
What next? On culture essentialized and identities
ignored
'I'd rather stare at my navel than walk up to the native ass backwards.'
(Bob Scholte)
The preceding paragraph, if left alone, would give the impression
that, though all is not well, we are at least working in a field with
recognizable boundaries. We are all questioning our grands recits
about our objects, we are all uncertain about our projects, and we
all doubt the representation of local knowledges in local texts.
Ortner's image of paradigmatic unity, whether it is under the flag
of 'practice', 'text' or 'postmodernism', seems applicable.
We shall not discuss here whether this is a good assessment of
the present postmodern condition, or whether it addresses a mere
surface appearance of a thoroughly capitalized global condition in
which pragmatism reigns (but see Friedman, in this volume;
Jameson, 1984a). However, we still wonder why, during the
conference that was the basis for this book, the multiple voices of
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anthropological experience did not seem to get an equal hearing.
Identities were upheld and defended, but also ignored or sup-
pressed. To us, that suggests that a more radical anthropology of
anthropology is still necessary, or, better yet, that we should be
careful not to lose the radical anti-professional critique of
anthropology of the late 1960s. We have not yet stared at our
navels long enough.
Our worries about the reflexivity of the literary turn are
illustrated by the cover photograph of Writing Culture (Clifford
and Marcus, 1986). It shows Stephen Tyler writing - with his back
towards, indeed, whom? Savage, native, informant, interlocutor or
co-producer of his texts? To what extent do we still work 'ass
backwards'? We need a self-conscious writing practice, agreed, but
if we concentrate on ethnographic writing only, it may be merely
a convenient symbol with which to reduce anthropological experi-
ence. Moreover, it may become a new claim for anthropological
professionalism founded on an essentialized concept of cultural
difference.
This accusation has especially been levelled at those closest to
symbolic anthropology, and at Geertz himself. Friedman (in this
volume) rightly points out that the Geertzian perspective is meant
to have the ethnographic project continue (see also Kapferer, 1988,
who describes Taussig's ethnographic experiments as a 'new
positivism'). Marcus and Fischer found anthropology on the Geert-
zian claim for authority, making the description of cultural diver-
sity the hallmark of anthropology (1986: 19). They dismiss the
critique of the primacy of cultural difference by someone like
Edward Said (1986: 1-2). Everything points to a renewal of the
claim to ethnographic authority on the basis of the classical reflex-
ivity of getting to know Us by means of Them (see Marcus and
Fischer, 1986: 137). The anthropologist's cultural mission comes
home to the West, but it remains a critique of the Western us for
the Western us by using the non-Western other, all ethnographic
experiments notwithstanding. This would also explain why the less
distressing forms of postmodern anthropology have almost become
mainstream in less than a decade (Handler, cited in Wilford, 1990:
B8), something to which other critical initiatives have never been
able to aspire.
Such a re-entrenchment of anthropological authority can easily
go together with a critique of ethnographic authority: for is it not
the Western academic who has the initiative in calling for experi-
mentation? Therefore we do not have a reflexivity which goes
beyond the limited conception of the anthropologist as ethno-
grapher. We need a more encompassing view of writing, including
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the contexts in which we start to write. To acknowledge that our
writing is a process of the conversion of our and the other's
experience and communication into academic capital, we have to
be clear about the fact that we are not merely engaged in 'writing
down' field notes and 'writing up' research results. To be taken
seriously in the academy, we also have to write ourselves in the
history of the discipline and, consequently, write off rival academic
currents."
An anthropologist's field experience implies not merely the
notebook, tape-recorder and the communication process that is
needed to make use of them. It also implies that the researcher is
physically present and, consequently, that the anthropologist can
freely dispose of sponsors' money, travel possibilities and whatnot.
Relying on these assets, the anthropologist takes the initiative in
the processes of negotiation, dissimulation, power play, bribe and
plain lying which accompany fieldwork. That does not preclude the
possibility of becoming a friend, nor does it deny that the
anthropologist's feelings go beyond the dictates of research goals
and methods. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the coming of the
stranger is conditioned by global and local inequalities. We must
not assume that each and every event in the fieldwork process is
distorted by these inequalities (that may have been the mistake of
the critique of the late 1960s): the people we encounter as anthro-
pologists are usually perfectly capable of taking care of themselves.
But suspicion is justified and we need a lot more accounts from the
grassroots to see where we stand. (The chapters of Fabian, Pool
and Schrijvers in this volume are examples of such accounts.)
Coming back from the field also has its structural constraints.
Marcus definitely does not go far enough into an ethnography of
anthropology's professional culture if he merely remarks on the
exigencies of producing a dissertation (Marcus, 1986). An under-
standing of the power-play necessary after having been accepted
formally as a qualified anthropologist is equally important for the
formation of a critical anthropological practice. In this struggle,
authority is contested; it is simultaneously reaffirmed and denied
by a process of inscribing oneself and writing off others.
The postmodern movement, like many other anthropological
claims for authority, uses these strategies of inscription and
'writing off to its own advantage. As noted above, postmodern
and symbolic anthropologists try to embalm and bury the radical
critique of anthropological professionalism which we try to
reassert. A new claim for professional identity has to play down
threats against the profession. Feminist anthropology, too, is put
aside by ill-concealed strategies. Clifford, for instance, cannot hide
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the contradiction between the claim that feminist anthropology
'has not produced unconventional forms of writing' and his
simultaneous citation of three important examples of it. He
attempts to clean ethnographic experimentation of feminist stains
(1986: 20-1), while making use of the insights put forward by
feminism. (See his discussion of Lienhardt, in 1986: 17. The point
is taken from Mascia-Lees et al., 1989.)
Postmodernists also hide their present claim to authority by
inscribing it in the past. A rather innocent example of this is
Tyler's eschatological way of presenting the coming of postmodern
anthropology: the use of the past tense for what has gone before
and the present for postmodern anthropology (1986: 123) reminds
one strongly of the way he described the epistemological divide
between 'cognitive anthropology' and the unscientific bricolage
that he thought preceded it (1969: 2-3, 11). In a more pernicious
vein, Marcus and Fischer rewrite anthropology's history by claim-
ing the culturalist experience ('not to make universally valid
statements', 1986: 22) as the general experience of anthropology,
and suggesting that the project of a generalized science of man
(and its consequent subsumption of cultural difference under a
more encompassing framework) died in anthropology when we
entered the twentieth century. Levi-Strauss would not agree, nor do
we.
Given the ascent of postmodern initiatives to mainstream status,
these writing practices, far from being innocent, exhibit the
strategies of inclusion and exclusion necessary for the accumulation
and increasing of academic capital (reputation, tenure, publishers).
These academic projects may be necessary in the present historical
context, also for critical anthropologists. But the boundaries
between reflexivity and silence do not become less arbitrary by
ignorance. Feminists claim that these strategies, the exclusion of
specific anthropological identities, work to the detriment of women
(see Moore, 1988: 6; Mascia-Lees et al., 1989; Richters, in this
volume). The cases cited above confirm their points.
Similarly, the structures of academic production still effectively
keep out non-Western voices: the standards of production of texts,
availability of research opportunities, library facilities, printing
possibilities, all are still largely in the hands of Western academics.
Occasionally, a non-Western voice manages to intrude (as the
example of the black women's critique of feminist theory shows).
But, generally, the initiative is in Western hands, as is unfor-
tunately also demonstrated by the list of contributors to this
volume.
So, contra Clifford (1986: 9), we argue that the image of the
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exploiting anthropologist cannot (yet) be dismissed as a caricature.
It will remain necessary to look for the structural constraints on
the production of anthropological knowledge and the formulation
of anthropological projects as long as the present structure of the
academy remains as it is (Fabian, in this volume). The reduction
of the crisis of anthropology to a crisis of representation (Marcus
and Fischer, 1986: 8), and of writing practice to the 'dialogue of
fieldwork' and the 'communication to a readership' (1986: 31)
stunts our reflexivity. It erases our consciousness of the social
context in which we work and the political engagements we enter
into to such an extent that we cannot make use of the theories of
the subject of science which have been in use for some time outside
anthropology (see, for instance, Bourdieu, 1975; Latour and
Woolgar, 1979; several essays in Harding and O'Barr, 1987;
Haraway, 1988).
Anthropology itself has already produced sophisticated accounts
of the ways in which we create objects out of the communication
process going on in the field (see, for instance, Fabian, 1979,
1983). We need these 'second-order narratives' (Richters in this
volume) about the academic subject and object to become
acquainted with the power relationships in which we move. If our
own project is not clear, we will fail to recognize the project of
others. If we keep silent about the motivations of our own
statements, other voices will be muted by it. This may be the
'anthropology' for which Friedman enters a plea (in this volume).
Our objects may crumble, but that may be a necessary step if we
still want our projects to aspire to the generality of the root:
anthropos.
The book's contents
There remains the task of accounting for our organization of the
essays that follow. Anthropology has embodied the ideals of the
Enlightenment by paradoxically combining the critique of Western
values and the trust in Western rationality. The liberation promised
by these ideals has become suspect in the postmodern condition.
The juxtaposition of the chapters by Ton Lemaire and Gerrit
Huizer in Part I is meant to show that we are not necessarily past
modernism in the postmodern condition. On the one hand.
Enlightenment ideals still carry promises. Ton Lemaire argues that
we either abandon the claim for a general social science or accept
the exceptional character of modernity. Huizer shows that current
anthropology still holds on to a Western concept of reason in the
encounter with healing and witchcraft, making imperative a further
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step in the liberation from ethnocentric premisses. On the other
hand, both authors also show the paradoxes to which Enlighten-
ment ideals can lead. Huizer says anthropology is still ethnocentric,
while Lemaire says Western reason is the vehicle for the overcom-
ing of ethnocentrism even though it is so by virtue of a history of
domination. While Huizer stresses participation, Lemaire argues
for a more distanced view. The first stresses that we relinquish
doubt in the belief of others, for the second it is the prime
characteristic of the Western ratio.
Part II opens with a chapter by Robert Pool, which is the only
essay not presented at the Conference. He shows how the uncer-
tainty about ethnographic form and content created by postmodern
critiques in fact opens up possibilities which make the writing of
an ethnography decidedly more adventurous and the voice of
others more clear. While he shows the advantages of a postmodern
approach, Tyler shows its extremes. The two chapters thus repre-
sent positive instances of postmodernism in anthropology.
Part III is devoted to the critique of postmodernist interventions
in anthropology. Jonathan Friedman provides a strong argument
against the essentialized conception of culture of many postmoder-
nists. Annelies Moors questions the primacy of the concept of
difference in postmodernism and postmodern feminism. Both voice
the doubts that we have referred to in this Introduction. Their
chapters, together with Annemiek Richters's comprehensive over-
view of the tension between postmodern perspectives and critique,
provide the kind of critical confrontations with postmodernism we
think are sorely needed. All three produce doubts about the new
professionalism which postmodernism invites, from the standpoint
of distinct political projects - and in particular by the feminist
consciousness of the marginal position which feminist anthro-
pology still finds itself.
In the last part of this volume we have grouped the essays which
address the possibility of a more thorough reflexive study of
anthropological thought and praxis. Olivia Harris takes a hard
look at the way in which the comparisons inherent in ethnographic
writing use a concept of time which relies on a fictitious Western
identity. Joke Schrijvers and Johannes Fabian provide grassroots
accounts of ethnographic work, providing that enrichment of
anthropological thinking which can only come from fieldwork
experience. They also show that critical anthropological perspec-




1 For a more detailed report of the issues which arose at the Conference see
Nencel and Pels, 1989.
2 This would attribute to postmodernism a position in mainstream anthropology
which it may have attained (see Handler, cited in Wilford, 1990: B8) but which
we doubt it truly merits.
3 Stocking makes clear, however, that it was not colonial u t i l i ty but the promise
of esoteric scientific knowledge which sold the discipline to the Rockefeller
Foundation (1985: 137).
4 Of course, this subversion was generally masked (see Crapanzano, 1986). The
ethnographer always moves in a field of paradox, where, for instance, the attack
on Western values could not do without a reaffirmation of the (Western)
anthropologist's authority.
5 In a draft of the essay published in this volume.
6 This is one of the few objections to Moore's overview of feminism and
anthropology (1988): her account of the origins of feminist anthropology lays
too much emphasis on Ardener (1975, first published 1971) and places Marxist
feminist theory on the side as merely one of the currents.
7 An example of this ethnocentrism was the concept of motherhood, which was
conceived as oppressive in the Western feminist context, and transposed to Third
World contexts without questioning its validity for these societies.
8 Thus, paradoxically, the globalization of the object discouraged the globaliza-
tion of the project, a world-wide emancipation of the oppressed, due to the
gloomy picture it developed of the possibilities of this emancipation.
9 Which was what happened when Tyler presented this paper at the conference on
critical anthropology in Amsterdam.
10 In the meantime, we are inclined to dismiss Tyler's rejection of representation
as it appears to deny the very possibility for an engagement with others. The
reflexivity we stand for is not meant to create a modernist consensus or a
postmodernist 'dissensus' (see Tyler, this volume) but to validate communication
between self and other. Though Tyler aptly warns us for pretending to speak for
others, we doubt whether his poetics will improve our capacities for listening or
speaking to them. It may be that representation and, indeed, some form of self-
critique, is necessary for any communicative performance. Conversely, his
attempts to 'evoke' instead of to represent suggest that he uses a kind of 'mcta-
reflexivity' which Latour (1988) claims serves to maintain the upper hand on the
reader in the politics of explanation.
11 The terms 'writing down' and 'writing up' are taken from Fabian (this volume).
The accusation of ignoring 'writ ing in' and 'writing off , however, is not
levelled at him. 'Writing in' or 'inscription' refers to a process in which the
statements (in this case, interpretations of the history of anthropology) inscribed
are stripped of their subjectivity and made into facts (see Latour and Woolgar,
1979). 'Wri t ing off has a double connotation, both applicable to anthropology.
In this context, however, we do not refer to 'writing off as in 'living off other
people, but to the second connotation: 'dispensing with' .
